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Abstract
Using a large and unique real-life dataset we study gender di⁄erences in
the recommendation issuing process of security analysts. We observe gender
heterogeneity in the probability to issue a particular type of recommen-
dation. We document that the di⁄erences are most pronounced when the
dispersion in existing recommendations is low; male analyst have a larger
probability to issue extreme positive recommendations and to deviate from
the consensus recommendation, exactly at the time the market could in-
terpret this behavior as being skilled. The di⁄erences in opinion between
Strong Buy recommendations of male analysts and conservative Hold rec-
ommendations of female analysts are almost 30% before 2002, while they
decrease to 9% after 2001.
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11 Introduction
A large literature in psychology and sociology has shown that there is heterogeneity
in the decision making process of men and women. One of the driving factors for
this observed heterogeneity seems to be gender speci￿c risk preferences. It is a
common ￿nding that women are more risk-averse decision makers (see for example
Cohen and Einav (2007)), take less extreme decisions and try to avoid competitive
situations (see Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)). Furthermore, women￿ s decisions
show much less heterogeneity than male decisions. While the evidence for gender
e⁄ects in psychology and sociology is strong and clear, the empirical evidence
in the (￿nancial) economics literature is rather mixed. The current empirical
evidence in ￿nancial economics suggests that, once controlling for heterogeneity in
professional and competitive environments, gender does not matter the ￿nancial
decision making process (see for example Croson and Gneezy (2004)). In this study
we present empirical evidence that there is gender heterogeneity in a professional
working environment.
Several studies present evidence that women are more risk-averse than men in
￿nancial decision making. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) examine household
holdings of risky assets to determine whether there are gender di⁄erences in ￿nan-
cial risk taking. They ￿nd that the proportion of wealth held in risky assets is
smaller for single women than for single men. In a similar context, Balkin (2000)
￿nds that women follow a less risky investment strategy when saving for retirement
in their 401(k) investment plans. Recently, Cohen and Einav (2007) have shown
that women are more risk-averse using a large data set of deductible choices in
auto insurance contracts. In the context of corporate decision taking, Cadsby and
Maynes (2005) ￿nd that women are less extreme decision makers and there is less
observed heterogeneity among women￿ s decisions. Finally, Barsky et al. (1997)
￿nd that women self-report a lower risk propensity than men. However, Croson
and Gneezy (2004) show in their survey that these ￿ndings carry important excep-
tions that are related to the type of economic agents under investigation. Gender
heterogeneity in risk preferences of professional agents is very di⁄erent than from
those of the general population. The driving factor of these results seems to be
that gender-speci￿c risk attitudes may be confounded with di⁄erences in individ-
ual opportunity sets, such as knowledge disparities or gender-speci￿c constraintsin underlying (￿nancial) choices. Atkinson et al. (2003) show that male and fe-
male ￿xed-income mutual fund managers do not exhibit signi￿cant di⁄erences in
performance, risks taken or other fund characteristics. Bliss and Potter (2002)
document similar ￿ndings for the fund management business. In addition, Dwyer
et al. (2002) observe that female investors take less risk than male investors. How-
ever, when controlling for ￿nancial investment knowledge, the gender-based risk
di⁄erences largely disappear.
The empirical evidence therefore suggests that, once controlling for heterogene-
ity in ￿nancial knowledge and professional environment, gender does not matter
for risk preferences. However, Niessen and Ruenzi (2007) study gender di⁄er-
ences among mutual fund managers and they ￿nd that female fund managers
have a di⁄erent investment style and follow less risky and less extreme investment
strategies than their male counterparts. They also ￿nd that women follow more
time-consistent investment styles.
We investigate whether gender heterogeneity exists in the behavior of sell-side
analysts. We argue that analyst recommendations provide us with a great lab-
oratory to explore whether gender di⁄erences matter in a professional setting.
First, by studying sell-side analysts we can immediately observe the outcome of
the decision making process as it is re￿ ected in only ￿ve di⁄erent individual stock
recommendation types that are communicated to the public. This is in contrast
to studying mutual fund manager behavior for which only the aggregate outcome
of their decisions can be observed by checking, in hindsight, how they changed the
composition of their portfolios. Second, academics and practitioners are convinced
that the recommendation issuing process is not a simple valuation decision, but
the result of a complex decision making process that re￿ ects the individual opin-
ion of the analyst based upon his perspective and risk tolerance. Several studies
have shown that fundamental valuation models are not very successful in explain-
ing the level and the changes in recommendations (see, among others, Bradshaw
(2004), Block (1999) and Cornell (2001)) and several behavioral biases are well
documented. If it is true that female stock analysts are more risk averse, less
extreme and avoid competition, we expect them to issue more conservative recom-
mendations than men. This implies that female analysts hide behind the consensus
and show more herding behavior. Male analysts on the other hand, would prefer
to stand out of the group and therefore are more likely to issue more risky and
2extreme recommendations.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, to our knowledge, our
study is the ￿rst to use such a large real-life dataset to investigate risky ￿nancial
decisions taken by professionals. It allows us to adequately control for di⁄erences
in individual opportunity sets (quality of the observations), and not lose in terms of
research scale (quantity of observations). Most existing large scale survey studies
do not control for knowledge di⁄erences or wealth constraints (see for example
Sunden and Surette (1998)). On the other hand, studies that do control for such
di⁄erences are often small-scale analyses and/or experiments (e.g. Atkinson et al.
(2003) and Johnson and Powell (1994)).
Second, we observe gender heterogeneity in the recommendation issuing process
of professional sell-side analysts. Controlled for experience and available resources
we ￿nd that both female as well as male analysts have the tendency to herd and
to react to disagreement by issuing more conservative recommendations. However,
male analysts di⁄er from female analysts in the strength of their signals. Men are
always more likely to issue more extreme recommendations (both positive and neg-
ative), while female analysts seem to be less risk-prone and are more likely to issue
more conservative recommendations. These gender di⁄erences are mainly driven
by the di⁄erence in reaction to the degree of the prevailing di⁄erences in opinion.
When there is agreement among analysts, male analysts have a larger probability
to issue Strong Buy recommendations than female analysts. In contrast, female an-
alysts have a larger probability to issue more conservative Hold recommendations.
This indicates that male analysts are more likely to be optimistic and propose
extreme a¢ rmative actions. We show that, in the ￿rst half of the sample, the rela-
tive probability di⁄erences between Strong Buy recommendations of men and Hold
recommendations of women are on average about 13%. However, when agreement
among analyst is large, these di⁄erences are almost 30%.
Finally, we observe that gender heterogeneity in the recommendations issuing
process has decreased after 2001. Apparently, the remaining female analysts re-
semble more and more the male analysts. Whether this is adaptive behavior or
the result of a self-selection mechanism is still an open question. In the context
of security analysts we believe that the latter hypothesis is of particular interest.
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) argue that women and men di⁄er in their selec-
tion into a competitive environment. Whereas women tend to avoid competition,
3men actually seek the challenge of competition. Investment banking has always
been a very competitive industry, potentially less appealing to women who tend to
shy away from competition. Moreover, the collapse of technology stocks in 2001,
subsequent regulation changes by the NASD and increased the scrutiny of ana-
lysts￿practices by the SEC, potentially discouraged women to become or remain
a sell-side analyst.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
sample selection procedure and provides a descriptive pro￿le of the analyst data-
base. The research methodology is described in Section 3, and empirical results
are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The analyst recommendations used in this study are provided by the Institutional
Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database, which is part of Thomson Finan-
cial. The recommendations encompass the period 1996 - 2006.1 Each data record
includes information about, among other things, the recommendation, the recom-
mendation date, an identi￿er for the brokerage house issuing the recommendation
and for the particular analyst that gives the recommendation (the surname and
￿rst initial). Recommendations are given on a ￿ve-point scale. I/B/E/S collects
the recommendations and assigns standardized numerical values to them. A rating
of 1 re￿ ects a strong buy, 2 re￿ ects a buy, 3 a hold, 4 a sell, and ￿nally a score
of 5 corresponds to a strong sell. To allow for a more intuitive interpretation of
our results we follow Jegadeesh et al. (2004) and reverse the ordering of the val-
ues, so that more favorable recommendations receive a higher score. We trim the
I/B/E/S database by deleting incomplete observations. These are observations
that lack identi￿cation of the analyst, the brokerage house the analyst works for,
the company that is being followed and the corresponding industry, the recom-
1The I/B/E/S data that we use for our analysis below, has been downloaded in February 2007.
A recent paper by Ljungqvist et al. (2007) shows that ex post changes are implemented in the
I/B/E/S database. In their Appendix A they show that since February 12, 2007 many, but not
all of the changes (anonymizations, alterations and deletions) in the recommendations database
have been reinstated. We do not have earlier snapshots of the I/B/E/S database available as in
Ljungqvist et al. (2007). Therefore it is impossible for us to check whether the changes in the
database were random accross gender and subsequently how their ￿ndings in￿ uence the results
of this paper.
4mendation, or the monthly consensus recommendation. This trimming procedure
leaves us with 333,492 recommendations over the sample period of 11 years.
This recommendations￿sample is combined with Nelson￿ s Directory of Invest-
ment Research (editions 1997 - 2007). Nelson￿ s Directory is a yearly analysts￿
contact details book and contains an analyst￿ s full name, the brokerage house
(s)he is employed for, her/his specialization, and contact information. We use this
information to manually match the I/B/E/S analyst identi￿cation with the full
￿rst name and last name of each analyst. Based on the ￿rst name, we determine
the gender of each analyst. We rely on a website that contains a program using
Google￿ s database to analyze common patterns involving ￿rst names.2 It deter-
mines from popular usage on the web whether a name is more common for a man
or a woman. If we are not sure of the gender of the analyst, we check the name
and gender by searching the history of the analyst on the internet. We delete ob-
servations when there is any ambiguity of the gender. From the 333,492 complete
observations in I/B/E/S we are able to match 94% with the corresponding gender
of the analyst. Finally, we trim the database by eliminating analysts covering an
extreme number of ￿rms (we top o⁄the 99th percentile), and we restrict our sample
to companies covered by at least one male and one female analyst simultaneously.
Our ￿nal sample contains 253,433 observations.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of analyst recommendations
used in the paper. The total sample consists of recommendations of 7,091 unique
analysts from 537 brokerage houses covering 4,939 ￿rms. The annual number of
recommendations steadily increases, reaching a peak in 2002. From that point
onwards, the number of recommendations decreases rapidly, to reach a level at
the end of our sample period that slightly above that of 1996. In addition, for
the number of ￿rms covered and the number of analysts employed, we observe
a similar but weaker trend. The number of brokerage houses is larger in the
second half of the sample. Finally, female analysts are clearly in the minority as
only 17% of all analysts in the complete sample are women. Moreover, there is
a clear downward trend in the number of female analysts, falling from 16-17% of
the analyst community until 2002 to only 13% in 2006. Interestingly, the trend
break coincides with a turbulent stock market period and a change in the analysts￿
professional environment. In this context, Conrad et al. (2006) state that the
2See http://www.gpeters.com/names/baby-names.php.
5collapse of technology stocks introduced a sometimes contentious debate on the
neutrality of analysts with several Wall Street ￿rms, with their analysts being
sued for giving subjective information to their clients.3 This introduced increased
scrutiny of analysts￿practices by the SEC and the states attorneys general. Such
reinforcement of the legal and supervisory frame of the profession could increase
the competition in the industry and this could discourage women to stay employed
as an analyst. Finally, also note that these results not only point to the low
representation of women in the profession, but also show high job turnover rates
as the percentage of female analysts employed over the full period of 11 years is
larger than the representation of women in any single year. This could be indicative
for a high work load, ￿erce competition and stress that comes with the job. Such
a job might be less attractive for women in the long run.
The descriptive statistics of the nature of the recommendations that are issued
by the analysts can be found in Table 2. This table reports the yearly average
recommendation, the yearly dispersion of recommendations as measured by the
standard deviation of outstanding recommendations and a frequency table of the
di⁄erent recommendation signals split by gender. There are no large di⁄erences
between the average male and female recommendations, neither between the dis-
persion of the recommendations. On average, male analysts seem to issue slightly
higher recommendations, while no gender-trend can be observed in the dispersion
of the recommendations issued. For both gender groups, we observe a rather high
mean recommendation. This corresponds to the well-documented upward bias in
recommendations, with analysts being reluctant to issue negative reports. Several
studies argue that mixed incentives of analysts lie at the basis of this bias.4 The
stock market hype surrounding the end of the second millennium even reinforced
this bias, as analysts became more positive over time, with a peak towards the
year 2000. With bearish markets starting in 2001, this trend reversed, with a
subsequent decrease in analysts￿ratings. Barber et al. (2007) and Conrad et al.
(2007) ￿nd the same dynamics and argue that this trend reversal can be the result
of a bad performing stock market and/or increased regulatory scrutiny of analysts￿
activities. The optimism in recommendations can also be seen from the frequency
distribution in Table 2. Until 2001 both male and female analysts issue few Strong
3See, for example Teather (2002).
4For recent evidence on the upward bias in the distribution of recommendations see Barber
et al. (2007), Lin et al. (2005) and Chen and Matsumoto (2006).
6Sell and Sell recommendations: combined they cover less than 3% of all recom-
mendations. From 2002 onwards the number of these negative reports increases to
more than 10% of all recommendations that are issued. This change in behavior
can also be seen in the increased dispersion. For the ￿rst half of the sample, the
standard deviation of the recommendations lies around 0.85. From 2002 onwards,
this number immediately increases to around 1, re￿ ecting the increased dispersion
in opinion among analysts. Note that the latter might be caused by the increased
diversity in risk of listed companies. However, the increased dispersion is consis-
tent over all the years in the second half of the sample. Considering the fact that
stock markets have been performing very well since 2003, we believe that there has
been a structural change in analyst behavior since 2002.
Prior studies have shown that analyst characteristics, other than gender, are
important in explaining analyst forecast accuracy (see e.g. Clement (1999) and
Clement and Tse (2005)). Such individual analyst characteristics might therefore
also impact the recommendation issuing process. Table 3 summarizes the individ-
ual characteristics of the analysts in our sample. We describe analysts￿abilities,
available resources and task complexity. Analysts￿abilities are proxied by a star
dummy variable, ￿rm speci￿c experience and total experience (both measured in
number of years).5 The star dummy is based on the yearly prestigious ranking
(￿ the Leaders￿ ) published in the October edition of Institutional Investor (see also
Hong and Kubic (2003) and Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006)). Institutional
Investor performs a yearly questionnaire to determine the best analysts of the pre-
vious year. Such ranking not only accounts for accuracy, but for the broad range of
services provided by analysts. Table 3 shows that for the male and female subsam-
ples around 2% of analysts is ranked as a star. Moreover, women have a slightly
higher probability to be ranked a star analyst. This ￿nding is con￿rmed by Green
et al. (2007) who ￿nd that women have a higher probability to be rewarded the
status of star analyst. These ￿ndings suggest that women outperform men in other
services such as client contact and the quality of their written reports. In terms
of ￿rm speci￿c experience and total experience, we see that for all years men have
more experience than women. This is not surprising given the higher job turnover
of women reported above.
5To obtain variation from the beginning of our sample onwards, we go back to 1993 to
compute ￿rm speci￿c and total experience of each analyst.
7Recent research has also shown that available resources are important for the
analysts￿job performance. Therefore we identify the brokerage houses that are
considered to be the best. Similar to the star rating of analysts, a ranking of
the best brokerage houses is also published in the October issue of Institutional
Investor. We identify the top 15 of the investment banks as top brokers. This
ranking is stable over time and covers the large and prestigious brokerage houses.
We ￿nd that female analysts have a slightly higher probability than men to be
employed by a top investment bank. Niessen en Ruenzi (2007) show that this is
also the case for mutual fund managers. They argue that female fund managers
are most likely to be employed by large and well-established companies for reasons
of political correctness. Finally, we consider task complexity by looking at the
number of ￿rms covered by an analyst in a given year, as well as at the number of
industries the analyst covers.6 When comparing male and female task complexity,
we see that male analysts cover more ￿rms, spread over more sectors than their
female colleagues. In 2002, the busiest year for the analysts (see Table 1 earlier),
analysts cover more companies than in any other year.
3 Research Methodology
The objective of this study is to analyze gender-speci￿c behavior in the recommen-
dation issuing process. The feature of the recommendation data suggest the use
of an ordered probit analysis: we explain the probability of the occurrence of each
recommendation that is issued by the security analysts as a function of gender-
speci￿c behavior. The values of the recommendation levels, REC, are limited
dependent variables, which implies that the true recommendations levels, REC￿
are unobservable. We assume a linear latent relationship:
REC
￿ = X
0￿ + "; (1)
where " is assumed to be a standardized unit normal distributed error term. We use
maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters ￿, which represent the marginal
e⁄ects of changes in the independent variables X, on the probabilities Pr(REC =
k) for k = 1;2;3;4 and 5. In addition, cuto⁄ points of the di⁄erent classes are
6The industry classi￿cation is based on the I/B/E/S SIGC division, and distinguishes 11
industries.
8assumed such that:
REC = i if ￿i￿1 < REC
￿ ￿ ￿i;
i = 1;:::;5, where ￿0 = ￿1 and ￿5 = 1. Note that, except for the endpoints
￿1 and ￿4; the sign of the changes in the probabilities as a function of changes
in the regressors is ambiguous (see Long (1997)). In the empirical section below,
we therefore focus on relative probability di⁄erences evaluated at speci￿c variable
levels to provide an interpretation of the estimated parameters.
We estimate the above model separately for male and female analysts, to cap-
ture gender heterogeneity in the decision making behavior of analysts. Given the
existing evidence of behavioral decision making, we include the previous consensus
recommendation, as well as the dispersion of previous recommendations as ex-
planatory variables. First, the consensus recommendation captures the potential
herding behavior among analysts, a well documented behavioral bias (see, among
others, Welch (2000), Hong et al. (2000), Clement and Tse (2005), and most
recently Jegadeesh and Kim (2007)). We expect a positive e⁄ect for herding be-
havior.7 The higher the previous consensus, the higher is the probability of also
issuing a high recommendation. Moreover, if female analysts are more conserva-
tive decision makers, we expect them to take less extreme decisions. They will,
more than their male colleagues, issue moderate recommendations. In our analysis
we use the mean recommendation that is valid in the month before a particular
recommendation is issued by the analyst, to proxy for the consensus.
Second, dispersion around the consensus recommendation re￿ ects the lack of
agreement among analysts. This interpretation of dispersion is also set forth in
Diether et al. (2002). They argue that dispersion in earnings forecasts of an-
alysts re￿ ects di⁄erences in opinion and they ￿nd that a higher level of disper-
sion corresponds to lower future returns.8 Theoretically, their results support the
price-optimism models as introduced by Miller (1977) suggesting that the larger
the disagreement about the stock￿ s value, the higher the current market price rel-
ative to the true value of the stock, and thus the lower its future returns. We
therefore expect a negative e⁄ect of dispersion. The low future returns induces
7While the consensus recommendation in the month before the recommendation is issued does
not necessarily capture herding, a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect at least indicates that information
only slowly disseminates among analysts.
8Dispersion in opinion has also been connected to lower future stock returns by Chen et al.
(2001) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000).
9analysts to issue rather low recommendations. Again, we expect male analysts to
be more risk-seeking and pronounced decision makers. This translates into male
recommendations that are relatively more at the extreme positive or negative side
of the distribution. In our model, such di⁄erences in opinion is proxied by the
standard deviation of the recommendations valid in the month before a particular
recommendation is issued by the analyst.
Finally, we also include a number of individual analyst characteristics as control
variables. Such individual characteristics might also have a gender-speci￿c impact
on the level of recommendations issued. The characteristics we control for are the
variables proxying for analyst abilities, resources and task complexity as explained
in Section 2.9 To proxy for job experience of the analyst, we use total tenure
that the analyst is employed as an analyst, in addition to ￿rm tenure, the period
that the analyst has been covering a speci￿c company. We also consider the star
rating of Institutional Investor to capture analysts￿abilities and include this star
rating as a dummy variable. To proxy for job complexity, we include variables that
track the number of ￿rms and the number of industries the analyst has provided
recommendations for in the year of the recommendation issue. Finally, we account
for the resources available to the analyst. We include a top dummy variable that
identi￿es all analysts employed by the top 15 of the brokerage houses according
to the yearly Institutional Investor questionnaire. The expected impact of these
controls variables is relatively ambiguous and therefore we do not make any a priori
statements of their sign or size.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we present our empirical results. First, we provide full sample
results and show that gender di⁄erences among ￿nancial analyst recommendations
are statistically and economically signi￿cant. Second, using the observation that
there is a structural break in the data after 2001, we provide empirical results for
a split sample analysis. We show that gender di⁄erences have been larger in the
￿rst subsample. To conclude this section we present empirical results for every
year individually.
9In addition we controlled for many other e⁄ects in the individual characteristics by con-
trolling for e.g. non-linearities or cross-over e⁄ects. Including these additional variables did not
change our ￿ndings below.
104.1 Full Sample Results
Equation (1) is estimated separately for male and female analysts. Table 4 shows
the full sample estimation results of the ordered probit analysis. Almost all the
estimated coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level for the male and
female sample. In addition, the signs of the estimated coe¢ cient are the same,
which indicates that men and women behave in similar ways. The analysts￿re-
action to the consensus recommendation and the dispersion of recommendations
is in line with previous ￿ndings in the literature (see for example Clement and
Tse (2005) and Diether et al. (2002)). Analysts herd and they act more conserva-
tively when disagreement among their peers is large. First, the existing consensus
recommendation has a positive impact. The higher the previous consensus recom-
mendation, the higher the probability of issuing a high recommendation. Analysts
are therefore more likely to issue a recommendation that is close to the existing
consensus recommendation. This implies that analysts are susceptible to herding.
Second, dispersion of previously issued recommendations has a negative impact.
When there are large di⁄erences of opinion among analyst recommendations, an-
alysts are more likely to issue moderate recommendations.
The most important question of the analysis however, is whether there are
(signi￿cant) di⁄erences between male and female analysts￿decision behavior. For
male analysts, the estimates for both the consensus and the dispersion variable are
larger in absolute value. This is in line with our expectations: male analysts react
more aggressively to these public signals, resulting in higher probabilities to issue
more extreme recommendations than female analysts. For the dispersion variable
the gender di⁄erence is largest. The behavioral di⁄erences between men and women
is therefore largely driven by di⁄erences in reactions to disagreement. Despite the
ambiguous results reported in the prior literature, this paper is therefore the ￿rst
to show that the gender-related di⁄erences carry over to ￿nancial decision making
among professional agents.
Next, we describe the e⁄ects of the control variables. Tenure of the analysts
has a negative e⁄ect, implying that more experienced analysts are more likely to
issue lower recommendations. The star status on the other hand, is associated
with a higher probability to issue higher recommendations. This is an indication
that a star ranking is achieved when issuing very positive recommendations. The
11estimation results for job complexity indicate that there is no clear evidence on
how it in￿ uences the level of recommendations. The positive sign of the number
of industries means that analysts are more likely to issue more favorable recom-
mendations, the more industries they follow. On the contrary, the negative sign
of the number of ￿rms, means that analysts are more likely to issue less favorable
recommendations the more ￿rms they follow. Finally, analysts working for a top
brokerage house have a larger probability to issue lower recommendations. When
it comes to gender di⁄erences in the control variables, female analysts are ceteris
paribus more a⁄ected by the di⁄erent control variables, with the exception of the
variables Firm Tenure and Number of Industries covered. The more experienced
the female analyst, the more likely she is to issue a lower recommendation level.
In addition, female analysts who work for a top brokerage house are more likely
to issue less favorable recommendations than male analysts, while the female star
analyst is more likely to issue more favorable recommendations than male stars.
To conclude, female analysts are more likely to issue higher recommendations the
more industries they cover. The di⁄erences between the male and female esti-
mations are statistically signi￿cant as can be concluded from the Wald test. In
addition, Table 4 shows that except for the variables Number of Industries and
Number of Firms, all the individual estimates are signi￿cantly di⁄erent between
the genders.
Ordered probit regression results are notoriously di¢ cult to interpret econom-
ically. In order to obtain economic insight, we therefore calculate relative proba-
bility di⁄erences between the genders for every recommendation class. These are
calculated by dividing the male analyst probabilities for a certain recommendation
class by the female analyst probabilities, normalized around zero. When the rel-
ative probability is larger than zero, male analysts are more likely to choose that
recommendation level than female analysts. We concluded above that dispersion
among recommendations is the most important variable in our model. We there-
fore calculate the relative probabilities by varying the dispersion variable from
its average minus two times its standard deviation to its average plus two times
its standard deviation, while keeping all the other variables ￿xed at their sample
means. This provides us with a good measure of relative importance and enables
us to obtain clear insights into the di⁄erences among gender that is driven by the
uncertainty among analysts.
12When using the estimation results to calculate the probabilities to issue a cer-
tain recommendation, they correspond very well to the summary statistics in Table
2. This table also shows that it is not very likely that Strong Sell and Sell recom-
mendations are issued. In our evaluation we therefore limit ourselves to the three
recommendation classes that are most likely to occur (with a total probability of
at least 90%), which are the Hold, Buy and Strong Buy recommendations.
The results of the calculations are shown in Figure 1. We observe the largest
gender di⁄erences when dispersion of the recommendations is at its lowest point.
In this case the average male analyst has a 10% larger probability to issue an
extremely positive Strong Buy recommendation than the average female analyst.
At the same time the average female analyst has a 6% larger probability to issue the
more conservative Hold recommendation than the average male analyst.10 When
confronted with low dispersion of recommendations, the average male analyst is
more likely to be more optimistic about the company he is evaluating than the
average female analyst. It appears that male analysts use the opportunity of low
dispersion to stand out of the group by being more likely to issue a very optimistic
recommendations. This could be an indication that men are more overcon￿dent or
that men have a greater desire to please the management of the ￿rms they cover.
Finally, when dispersion increases, gender di⁄erences decrease. Male analyst are
less likely to issue more Strong Buy Recommendations, while female analysts are
less likely to more issue Hold Recommendations. We conclude from this that
analysts take into account that deviations from the mainstream is noticed less by
the market in the case when there is (more) disagreement among analysts. Male
analysts seem to have the largest incentives to deviate when the market is most
likely to interpret their recommendation as personal skill and ability and not as
luck.
4.2 Split Sample Results
As mentioned in Section 2 above, it is clear that there has been a trend break
in the issuing of recommendations after 2001. First, the combined probability of
issuing Strong Sell and Sell recommendations has increased from 3% before 2002,
10Also for the average level of dispersion we see gender di⁄erences: male analysts have a 4%
higher probability to issue Strong Buy recommendations, while female analysts have a 2% higher
probability to issue Hold recommendations.
13to around 10% after 2001, for both male and female analysts. One can argue that
this change can be accounted for by the very bad performance of companies im-
mediately after the technology shock. However, Table 2 shows that although stock
markets have done very well in recent years, the number of least favorable recom-
mendations issued by analysts did not decline. This indicates that a regime shift
in the recommendation generating process has taken place. Indeed, Barber et al.
(2007b) show that in the wake of numerous high-pro￿le corporate scandals (such
as those involving Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco) the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD) proposed rule 2711, which was approved by the
SEC on May 8, 2002. The rule contains a disclosure provision which entails that
every brokerage ￿rm is required to disclose in its research reports the distribution
of stock ratings across its coverage universe.11 They show that after the implemen-
tation of the rule on September 9, 2002, the recommendation distribution of the
ten brokerage ￿rms that were part of the Global Research Analyst Settlement12,
changed signi￿cantly.
Second, in Table 1 we can see that the number of female analysts is declining
after 2001. Several authors argue that this is most likely the result of occupational
self-selection, re￿ ecting a shift in women￿ s career preferences. First, experimental
evidence by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) suggests that men and women have
di⁄erent preferences concerning competition. They conclude that women shy away
from competition, while men seem to embrace it. The out￿ ow of female analysts
could indicate that women perceive the sector as more competitive than before.
Second, the increased scrutiny of analysts￿practices by investors and the SEC, in
addition to the threat of litigation has without doubt increased the responsibility
and, presumably also the risk of the analyst job. Women might ￿nd such job
occupation too demanding and thus less attractive. The question we try to answer
in this section is how this decline of female analysts a⁄ects gender di⁄erences in
the recommendations issuing process.
The estimations of the recommendation model (1) for the two subsamples 1996
- 2001 (Table 5) and 2002 - 2006 (Table 6) yield interesting results, again mainly
11A related provision of NASD 2711 is that every brokerage ￿rm must disclose in each of
its research reports its de￿nitions for buy, hold, and sell. These de￿nitions were not commonly
disclosed prior to the implementation of NASD 2711 (see footnote 7, Barber et al, 2007b).
12The Global Research Analyst Settlement was announced to be enforced on April 28, 2003,
by the SEC, NASD, NYSE, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, and other regulators.
14with respect to the dispersion variable. For the period 1996 - 2001, male analysts
are more likely to react more aggressively to analyst (dis-)agreement than their
female colleagues. This behavior, however, largely disappears in the period 2002-
2006. The di⁄erence in the dispersion estimates for the male and female subsamples
is much smaller. In addition, the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant any more.
In the recent subsample, women behave much like men in their attitude towards
analyst dispersion.13
The reduction in gender di⁄erences over time is more general as can be con-
cluded from the Wald tests. These tests tell us that although gender di⁄erences
are signi￿cant in both subsamples, it appears that they are less strong in the sec-
ond subsample. In addition, in the ￿rst subsample, ￿ve variables, among which
the consensus and dispersion variables, are individually statistically signi￿cant be-
tween the genders. In the second subsample, only the estimates for the variables
Total Tenure and Working for a Top Broker are individually signi￿cantly di⁄er-
ent. The gender di⁄erences seem to be driven by a di⁄erent behavior in the two
subsamples. For example, note the large increase in importance for the variable
Working for Top Broker. Both men and women become much more likely to issue
lower recommendations when working for a Top Brokerage ￿rm.
In line with our approach of the previous section, we calculate the relative
probability di⁄erences for the recommendation classes.14 The results con￿rm our
conclusions of the previous section and in addition they con￿rm our interpretation
of a structural break in the recommendation issuing process. Figure 2 shows the
relative probability di⁄erences for the period 1996 - 2001. When dispersion among
the recommendations is at its lowest point, the average male analyst has a 15%
larger probability to issue an extremely positive Strong Buy recommendation than
the average female analyst. At the same time the average female analyst has an
almost 14% larger probability to issue the more conservative Hold recommendation
than the average male analyst. In total, this constitutes a gender di⁄erence of
almost 30%. In contrast, Figure 3 shows that the relative probability di⁄erence
for Strong Buy recommendations in favor of male analysts has decreased to 7%,
while for Hold recommendations the di⁄erence decreased to only 2% in favor of
13A Wald test for signi￿cant di⁄erences between the subsamples for men and women seperately,
con￿rms that there has been a structural break after 2001 in the data.
14We calculate the relative probabilities by using the means for the all the variables, except
for the dispersion variable. The means are calculated for each subsample seperately.
15female analysts. Finally, note also that gender di⁄erences are substantial when
looking at the average degree of dispersion: while male analysts have an almost
7% larger probability to issue more Strong Buy recommendations in the period
1996-2001, female analysts have an 8% higher chance to issue more moderate Hold
recommendations. For the second period, the average gender di⁄erences decrease
substantially: male analysts still have a 3% larger probability to issue the most
favorable recommendations, while male and female analysts are equally likely to
issue Hold recommendations.
While gender di⁄erences are present in both subsamples, with a clear preference
by male (female) analysts for more extreme (conservative) recommendations, they
decrease over time, which causes male and female analysts to be more likely to
issue similar recommendations. The reason for this change is an open question. It
could be the result of adaptive behavior of the female analysts that remain active
in the investment banking business. It could also be the result of occupational self-
selection by women, whereby women that have a similar decision behavior than
men do not shy away from competition and decide to become or remain a sell-side
analyst. The latter could have been caused by the regulation changes that took
place during 2002, in the wake of the technology bubble burst.
4.3 Individual Year Results
The estimation results for the individual years are presented in Table 7 and are in
line with our ￿ndings above. First, for all years individually, we ￿nd that analysts,
male and female, herd. This can be concluded from the positive e⁄ect for the
outstanding recommendation. In addition, analysts are more likely to issue lower
recommendations when confronted with uncertainty, as implied by the negative
e⁄ect of dispersion of the recommendations. Second, the gender di⁄erences over
the years seems to con￿rm the trend observed in the split sample. For most
years, male analysts react more heavily to the consensus recommendations and to
prevailing uncertainty. This indicates that male analyst are, for the majority of
the years, the more extreme decision makers.
We interpret the estimation results in a similar way as above and calculate
the relative probabilities for each recommendations class. In Figure 4 we plot the
relative probabilities for the average analyst, in the case that uncertainty among
16analysts recommendations is at its lowest. We consider this particular case as it
has been shown in the previous sections that at this moment, gender heterogeneity
is most pronounced. We observe the following. Gender di⁄erences are very large in
the years 1996 - 2000. During 2001 and 2002, in the wake of the technology bubble
burst and during regulatory changes, there is hardly any gender heterogeneity,
while for the years 2003 - 2005 gender heterogeneity is clearly present, although
smaller than in the ￿rst part of the sample. Finally, in 2006 we observe a reversal
with respect to our previous ￿ndings. In 2006, when dispersion is low, female
analysts have a 5% larger probability of issuing Strong Buy Recommendations
while men have a 10% larger probability of issuing Hold recommendations. This
result is very puzzling as it is contradicts the intuition set forth in this paper.
Our conclusions are as follows. First, the individual year estimations con￿rm
the general trend that gender heterogeneity decreased over time, but it still ex-
ists, also in the recent years (see also Table 8 for the Wald tests). Second, the
self-selection argument is certainly able to explain a large part of the decrease in
gender di⁄erences, however some caution should be taken into account. With a fe-
male representation that is monotonically decreasing over time, if the self-selection
argument holds, we should expect a smooth decline in gender heterogeneity as
well. As the latter is clearly not the case, there should be other factors that deter-
mine gender heterogeneity in the decision making process of professional economic
agents.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature that investigates gender heterogeneity
in risky decision making. In particular, we focus on the professional and highly
competitive investment banking industry and investigate gender heterogeneity in
the recommendation issuing process of ￿nancial analysts. This provides us with
a great laboratory to explore whether gender di⁄erences matter in a professional
setting as we can immediately observe the outcome of the decision making process,
re￿ ected in a limited number of individual stock recommendations.
Our research establishes a link between gender and economic decision making
in a professional working environment. We present evidence of gender heterogene-
ity in the recommendation issuing process of sell-side analysts. We ￿nd that male
17analysts are more extreme and risk-seeking decision makers than female analysts.
Female analysts on the other hand, are more likely to issue moderate recommen-
dations. The average male analyst has a larger probability to issue Strong Sell
recommendations, while the average female analyst has a larger probability to
issue more conservative Hold recommendations. Gender heterogeneity reaches a
maximum when dispersion among existing recommendations is at its lowest. Ap-
parently, male analysts use the opportunity of low dispersion among analysts, i.e.
that point in time when noticed most, to issue extremely positive recommenda-
tions. In addition, in line with existing ￿nancial literature we ￿nd that when
controlling for individual characteristics, both male and female analysts have the
tendency to herd. Furthermore, analysts are more likely to issue more conservative
recommendations when faced with increased disagreement among their peers.
We observe that in the second half of our sample, gender heterogeneity declines.
Over time, male and female analysts seem to behave more and more in a similar
way. We believe that this can, for a large part, be attributed to the self-selection
mechanism in the choice of job by women. The female analysts behaving similar
to male analysts are apparently choosing to stay or be employed in the investment
banking business. Nevertheless, in recent years we still observe gender hetero-
geneity in the recommendation issuing process. It would be very interesting to
investigate whether changes in individual characteristics of the (female) analysts
can explain to what extent the self section mechanism plays a role in the decrease
in gender heterogeneity of the recommendation issuing process of sell-side analysts.
This question is left for future research.
18References
[1] Atkinson, S.M., S.B. Baird and M.B. Frye, 2003. Do Female Fund Managers
Behave Di⁄erently? The Journal of Financial Research 26: 1-18.
[2] Balkin, D., 2000. Gender E⁄ects of Employee Participation and Investment
Behavior with 401(k) Retirement Plans. Working Paper.
[3] Barber, B.M., R. Lehavy and B. Trueman, 2007. Comparing the Stock Rec-
ommendation Performance of Investment Banks and Independent Research
Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 85: 490-517.
[4] Barber, B.M., R. Lehavy, M. McNichols and B. Trueman, 2007b. Buys, Holds,
and Sells: The Distribution of Investment Banks￿Stock Ratings and the Im-
plications for the Pro￿tability of Analysts￿Recommendations. Forthcoming
in Journal of Accounting Research.
[5] Barsky, R.B., F.T. Juster, M.S. Kimball and M.D. Matthew, 1997. Preference
Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the
Health and Retirement Study. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 537-
579.
[6] Bliss and Potter, 2002. Mutual Fund Managers: Does Gender Matter? Journal
of Business and Economic Studies 8: 1-15.
[7] Block, S.B., 1999. A Study of Financial Analysts: Practice and Theory. Fi-
nancial Analysts Journal 55: 86-95.
[8] Bradshaw, M.T., 2004. How Do Analysts use Earnings Forecasts in Generating
Stock Recommendations? The Accounting Review 79: 25-50.
[9] Cadsby, C.B. and E. Maynes, 2005. Gender, Risk Aversion and the Drawing
Power of Equilibrium in an Experimental Corporate Takeover Game. Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization 56: 39-59.
19[10] Chen, S. and D.A. Matsumoto, 2006. Favorable versus Unfavorable Recom-
mendations: The Impact on Analyst Access to Management-Provided Infor-
mation. Journal of Accounting Research 44: 657-689.
[11] Chen, J., H. Hong and J.C. Stein, 2001. Breadth of Ownership and Stock
Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 66: 171-205.
[12] Clement, M.B., 1999. Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Do Ability, Resources and
Portfolio Complexity Matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 285-
303.
[13] Clement, M.B. and S.Y. Tse, 2005. Financial Analyst Characteristics and
Herding Behavior in Forecasting. The Journal of Finance 60: 307-341.
[14] Cohen, A. and L. Einav (2007). Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible
Choice, American Economic Review 97: 745-788.
[15] Conrad, J., B. Cornell, W. Landsman and B. Rountree (2006). How do An-
alyst Recommendations Respond to Major News? Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 41: 25-49.
[16] Cornell, B., 2001. Is the Response of Analysts to Information Consistent with
Fundamental Valuation: The Case of Intel. Financial Management 30: 113-
136.
[17] Croson, R. and U. Gneezy, 2004. Gender Di⁄erences in Preferences. Working
Paper, Wharton School.
[18] Diether, K.B., C.J. Malloy and A. Sherbina, 2002. Di⁄erences of Opinion and
the Cross Section of Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance 57: 2113-2141.
[19] Dwyer, P.D., J.H. Gilkeson and J.A. List, 2002. Gender Di⁄erences in Re-
vealed Risk Taking: Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers. Economics Let-
ters 76: 151-158.
[20] Green, T.C., N. Jegadeesh and Y. Tang (2007). Gender and Job Performance:
Evidence from Wall Street. Working Paper, NBER No. 12897, available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=956101.
20[21] Hong, H. and J. Kubik, 2003. Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and
Biased Earnings Forecasts. The Journal of Finance 58: 313-351.
[22] Hong, H., J. Kubik and A. Solomon, 2000. Security Analysts￿Career Concerns
and Herding of Earnings Forecasts. Rand Journal of Economics 31: 121￿ 144.
[23] Jegadeesh, N. and J. Kim, 2007. Do Analysts Herd? An Analysis of
Analysts￿ Recommendations and Market Reactions. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=957192.
[24] Jegadeesh, N., J. Kim, S.D. Krische and C.M.C. Lee, 2004. Analyzing the
Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value? The Journal of Finance
59: 1083-1124.
[25] Jianakoplos, N.A. and A. Bernasek, 1998. Are Women More Risk Averse?
Economic Inquiry 36: 620-630.
[26] Johnson, J. and P.L. Powell, 1994. Decision Making, Risk and Gender: Are
Managers Di⁄erent? British Journal of Management 5: 123-138.
[27] Lee, C.M.C. and B. Swaminathan, 2000. Price Momentum and Trading Vol-
ume. The Journal of Finance 51: 2017-2069.
[28] Ljungqvist, A., C.J. Malloy and F.C. Marston, 2007. Rewriting History. Avail-
able at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=889322.
[29] Long, S., 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent
variables. Sage, London.
[30] Lin, H., M. McNichols and P.C. O￿ Brien (2005). Analyst Impartiality and
Investment Banking Relationships. Journal of Accounting Research 43: 623-
650.
[31] Miller, E.M., 1977. Risk, Uncertainty and Divergence of Opinion. The Journal
of Finance 32: 1151-1168.
[32] Niederle, M. and L.Vesterlund, 2007. Do Women Shy Away from Competi-
tion? Do Men Compete too Much? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:
1067 - 1101.
21[33] Niessen, A. and S. Ruenzi, 2007. Sex Matters: Gender Di⁄erences in a Pro-
fessional Setting. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=966243.
[34] Sorescu, S. and A. Subrahmanyam, 2006. The Cross Section of Analyst Rec-
ommendations. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41: 139- 168.
[35] Sunden, A.E. and B.J. Surette, 1998. Gender Di⁄erences in the Allocation of
Assets in Retirement Savings Plans. American Economic Review 88: 207-211.
[36] Teather, D., 2002, Wall Street Faces Prospect of Criminal Charges, The
Guardian, April 24.
[37] Thomson Financial, 1997-2007. Nelson￿ s Directory of Investment Research 22-
32. Nelson, New York, N.Y.
[38] Welch, I., 2000. Herding Among Security Analysts. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 58: 369￿ 396.
22Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Recommendations Sample
The recommendation data is obtained from I/B/E/S, while gender is identi￿ed
using Nelson￿ s Directory of Investment Research.
No. Rec. No. Firms Covered No. Brokers No. Analysts % Female
1996 16,816 2,671 176 2,056 16
1997 18,837 3,055 205 2,538 17
1998 23,380 3,362 220 2,996 17
1999 24,227 3,384 222 3,205 17
2000 22,264 3,233 214 3,133 17
2001 23,470 2,972 194 3,074 16
2002 35,977 3,032 203 3,162 16
2003 27,607 2,910 258 3,075 14
2004 23,847 2,932 286 3,061 14
2005 19,510 2,830 279 2,695 13
2006 17,498 2,681 243 2,315 13

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 4: Ordered Probit Results Full Sample
This table reports estimates of the ordered probit model on the samples for male and female analyst
respectively, for the period 1996-2006. The recommendation data is obtained from I/B/E/S, while
gender is identi￿ed using Nelson￿ s Directory of Investment Research. In the column labelled ￿ Ind.
Di⁄.￿ , a ￿ indicates that the individual male and female estimates are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
each other at the 5% signi￿cance level.
Male Analyst Female Analyst
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Ind. Di⁄.
Consensus(t￿1) 0.546 0.000 0.519 0.000 ￿
St. Dev. of Outstanding Recs(t￿1) ￿0.222 0.000 ￿0.130 0.000 ￿
Total Tenure ￿0.008 0.000 ￿0.022 0.000 ￿
Firm Tenure ￿0.011 0.000 ￿0.009 0.064
Number of Industries 0.004 0.087 0.009 0.135
Number of Firms ￿0.009 0.000 ￿0.005 0.000 ￿
Working for Top Broker ￿0.105 0.000 ￿0.158 0.000 ￿
Star Analyst 0.040 0.004 0.152 0.000 ￿
Nobs. 215,123 38,310





Wald test Male vs. Female ￿2
8 94.283 p-value 0.000
26Table 5: Ordered Probit Results Split Sample Before 2002
This table reports estimates of the ordered probit model on samples for male and female analyst
respectively, for the period 1996-2001. The recommendation data is obtained from I/B/E/S, while
gender is identi￿ed using Nelson￿ s Directory of Investment Research. In the column labelled ￿ Ind.
Di⁄.￿ , a ￿ indicates that the individual male and female estimates are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
each other at the 5% signi￿cance level.
Male Analyst Female Analyst
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Ind. Di⁄.
Consensus(t￿1) 0.443 0.000 0.436 0.000
St. Dev. of Outstanding Recs(t￿1) ￿0.158 0.000 ￿0.051 0.062 ￿
Total Tenure 0.014 0.000 ￿0.014 0.002 ￿
Firm Tenure ￿0.036 0.000 ￿0.031 0.000
Number of Industries ￿0.016 0.000 ￿0.005 0.537
Number of Firms ￿0.007 0.000 0.000 0.973 ￿
Working for Top Broker 0.031 0.000 ￿0.022 0.168 ￿
Star Analyst 0.014 0.494 0.150 0.000 ￿
Nobs. 108,083 20,911





Wald test Male vs. Female ￿2
8 86.159 p-value 0.000
27Table 6: Ordered Probit Results Split Sample After 2001
This table reports estimates of the ordered probit model on samples for male and female analyst
respectively, for the period 2002-2006. The recommendation data is obtained from I/B/E/S, while
gender is identi￿ed using Nelson￿ s Directory of Investment Research. In the column labelled ￿ Ind.
Di⁄.￿ , a ￿ indicates that the individual male and female estimates are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
each other at the 5% signi￿cance level.
Male Analyst Female Analyst
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Ind. Di⁄.
Consensus(t￿1) 0.471 0.000 0.462 0.000
St. Dev. of Outstanding Recs(t￿1) ￿0.172 0.000 ￿0.130 0.000
Total Tenure 0.006 0.000 ￿0.003 0.308 ￿
Firm Tenure ￿0.008 0.000 ￿0.003 0.601
Number of Industries 0.018 0.000 0.016 0.095
Number of Firms ￿0.008 0.000 ￿0.005 0.002
Working for Top Broker ￿0.238 0.000 ￿0.325 0.000 ￿
Star Analyst ￿0.010 0.606 0.064 0.166
Nobs. 107,040 17,399





Wald test Male vs. Female ￿2

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 8: Wald Test Results for Gender Di⁄erences per Year
This table reports the test statistics and the p-value of the Wald test for all


































The ￿gure shows the relative probability di⁄erences between male and female analyst for the three
largest recommendation classes Hold, Buy and Strong Buy. These are calculated by dividing the
male analyst probabilities for a recommendation class by the female analyst probabilities, normalized
around zero. All variables, accept the dispersion variable, are evaluated at their sample mean.
Figure 1: Relative Probability Di⁄erences Between Male and Female
Analysts









Standard Deviation of previous month recommendations




The ￿gure shows the relative probability di⁄erences between male and female analysts for the three
largest recommendation classes Hold, Buy and Strong Buy. These are calculated by dividing the
male analyst probabilities for a recommendation class by the female analyst probabilities, normalized
around zero. All variables, accept the dispersion variable, are evaluated at their sample mean.
Figure 2: Relative Probability Di⁄erences Between Male and Female
Analysts 1996 - 2001
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The ￿gure shows the relative probability di⁄erences between male and female analysts for the three
largest recommendation classes Hold, Buy and Strong Buy. These are calculated by dividing the
male analyst probabilities for a recommendation class by the female analyst probabilities, normalized
around zero. All variables, accept the dispersion variable, are evaluated at their sample mean.
Figure 3: Relative Probability Di⁄erences Between Male and Female




























































The ￿gure shows the relative probability di⁄erences between male and female analyst for each
recommendation class evaluated for full-sample means, and evaluated at the lowest dispersion of
recommendations (2 standard deviations below the average). These are calculated by dividing the
male analyst probabilities for a recommendation class by the female analyst probabilities, normalized
around zero.
Figure 4: Relative Probability Di⁄erences Between Male and Female
Analysts over the Years
36